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A Preferable Approach for the Ninth 
Circuit 
Procter Hug, Jr. t 
Carl Tobias:j: 
United States Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Frank Murkowski 
(R-Alaska) recently introduced Senate Bill 2184, which would split the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two circuits. 1 
This measure differs from Senate Bill 253 that embodies the recommenda-
tions submitted to Congress by the Commission on Structural Alternatives 
for the Federal Courts of Appeals after its one-year study.2 The 
Commission found "no persuasive evidence that the Ninth Circuit ... is 
not working effectively" and clearly rejected bifurcation.3 However, the 
Commission recommended that Congress impose a divisional restructuring 
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and authorize the other appellate 
courts to adopt divisional arrangements when their caseloads increase. 4 
Because Congress is still considering both legislative proposals, they re-
quire careful assessment. This analysis reveals that the two bills do not 
adequately treat the concerns that animated the study; the bills actually 
contradict the Commission's goals5 and suggest drastic solutions for 
Copyright© 2000 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Incorporated (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their 
publications. 
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
:j: Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank 
Chris Bryant, Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Jim Rogers for 
generous, continuing support, and Angela Dufva for processing this piece. We thank Mark Mendenhall, 
Assistant Circuit Executive, for invaluable assistance. These are our views, but they reflect those of 
two-thirds of the Ninth Circuit's members 
1. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000); see also 146 CONG. REc. S 1233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000). 
Senator Hatch is the chair of the Judiciary Committee. 
2. See generally COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; see also id. at 93-99 (providing the 
"proposed statutes" on which senators premised S. 253). 
3. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. 
4. See id. at 29-30. 
5. For these views of circuit-splitting as well as a description of the Commission's goals, see id. 
at ix-x, 34-37, 44, 47-50. For critical views of the divisional structure, see Federal Courts-Proposed 
Changes to the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Courts of Appeals, 113 HARv. L. REv. 822, 825 (2000) 
[hereinafter Critique]. 
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problems that do not exist. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has instituted an 
approach that is preferable to either alternative. A Ninth Circuit Evaluation 
Committee is assessing the court in light of the Commission's investigation 
and is crafting responses to certain concerns. Since the endeavor will be 
more effective than the radical, irrevocable strategies of bifurcation or di-
visional restructuring, the Committee's work also merits analysis. This 
essay undertakes that effort. 
We first summarize and critically evaluate the Commission's report 
and recommendations. Our essay then describes and scrutinizes the reasons 
proffered for splitting the circuit generally and for Senate Bill 2184 in par-
ticular. Finally, we consider a less dramatic and disruptive, and more 
promising, means to address certain perceived concerns identified by the 
Commission and the sponsors of Senate Bill 2184. We conclude that the 
Evaluation Committee approach will better attain the objectives of the 
Commission and of Senate Bill 2184 proponents; therefore, Congress 
should reject both the divisional concept and circuit splitting. 
I 
THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. The Commission's Authorization and Work 
The history of the Commission has received relatively extensive 
treatment elsewhere.6 Congress approved the Commission principally as a 
response to ongoing controversy over the Ninth Circuit.7 The court's size 
has prompted perennial calls for reconfiguration.8 Since 1983, lawmakers 
who championed a split have instituted numerous efforts to bifurcate the 
circuit.9 In 1997, Congress authorized an assessment.10 The Commission 
had a year to study the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of 
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and to 
write a report with recommendations for such structural or boundary 
6. See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts 
of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 887 (1999); JenniferE. Spreng, Three Divisions in One Circuit?: A Critique of the 
Recommendations From the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
35 IDAHO L. REv. 553 (1999); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 
FLA. L. REV. 189 (1997). 
7. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 
377 (2000); S. REP. No. 104-197 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Critique, 
supra note 5. 
9. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34. See generally Jennifer E. Spreng, The 
Icebox Cometh: A Fonner Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REv. 875, 
876 (1998). 
10. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111Stat.2440, 2491-93 (1997). See generally 
Hellman, supra note 7, at 378-81; Hug, supra note 6, at 892-93; Spreng, supra note 6, at 560. 
2000] NINTH CIRCUIT 1659 
changes "as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective 
disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent 
with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."11 
The Commission appeared to implement carefully its important re-
sponsibilities.12 In 1998, the Commission sought written input and held six 
public hearings.13 It also assembled statistical data, such as the percentages 
of oral arguments and published opinions that the court affords, the time 
needed for resolving appeals, and the measures employed since the 1970s 
to address caseload increases.14 In October, the Commission issued a tenta-
tive draft report with recommendations and solicited public comment on 
this tentative draft for thirty days. 15 After considering the public input, the 
Commission issued a minimally-changed final report that suggested that 
Congress require a divisional approach for the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and empower the other courts to apply divisional concepts as they 
grow.16 
In January 1999, Senators Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Murkowski 
introduced Senate Bill 253, proposed legislation that essentially embodies 
the Commission's suggestions. 17 
11. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii), 111 Stat. at 2491. See generally Tobias, supra 
note 6, at 206-11. 
12. We rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6 and Carl Tobias, A 
Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275, 295-98 (1999). 
13. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also Joseph N. Akrotirianakis et al., Jerry-
Building the Road to the Future: An Evaluation of the White Commission Report on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 355, 362 (1999). 
14. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (stating that caseload increases have transformed the circuits). 
15. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, 
TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 1998). See generally Hug, supra note 6, at 893-94; Spreng, supra 
note 9, at 877-78. 
16. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 40-47, 59-76. See generally Hug, supra note 6, 
at 897-98; Spreng, supra note 6, at 577-86; Tobias, supra note 12, at 304-10. 
17. Compare S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) with COM?lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-99; see 
also supra note 4 and accompanying text. In July of 1999, the Senate and House each held a committee 
hearing on the proposed legislation and on the final report prepared by the Commission. See Review of 
the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Regarding 
the Ninth Circuit and S. 253, the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act: Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts (1999) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]; 
Oversight Hearing on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (1999) 
[hereinafter House Hearing]. Between the dates of the Senate and House hearings, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D-Cal.) introduced a bill that would essentially reform the en bane process. See S. 1403, 
106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REc. S8884 (daily ed. July 20, 1999); see also infra notes 93-94, 102 
anti accompanying text. 
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B. Analysis of the Commission Report and Recommendations 
The Commission analyzed the circuit's pressures, emphasizing size, 18 
and canvassed ideas favoring and opposing bifurcation. Advocates of a 
split contended that circuit case law lacks sufficient consistency; that the 
court cannot decide appeals in a timely fashion; that its judges are unable 
to "keep up with the large volume" of opinions; and that there is 
inadequate judicial collegiality and interpersonal communication.19 
Moreover, the limited en bane process is purportedly flawed because it 
does not represent the unified voice of the circuit membership and contrib-
utes to a high Supreme Court reversal rate.20 
Those arguing against bifurcation pointed out that over two-thirds of 
Ninth Circuit judges oppose a split and believe the limited en bane process 
works well.21 The court is among the fastest circuits in resolving cases once 
argued or submitted to panels, and any delay in processing appeals from 
the time of filing is attributable to excessive vacant judgeships. 22 Oppo-
nents also contended that the court has established a sophisticated issue-
tracking system that allows judges to stay informed of the current law, that 
the judges are as collegial as those in any circuit, and that technology's 
continued use will improve communication and case disposition. 23 
Although the Commission possessed no empirical data to justify a 
major change in Ninth Circuit structure, it proposed restructuring the court 
of appeals into three semi-autonomous divisions. Each division would re-
view its panel decisions en bane, and a Circuit Division would consider 
only "square interdivisional conflicts."24 The Commission stated that its 
plan to modify the structure of the Ninth Circuit would enhance predict-
ability, communication, and ties to local communities, yet retain a large 
circuit's administrative benefits.25 
18. These include geographic scope, 28 active appellate judgeships and 8,700 annual appeals. 
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-32; Critique, supra note 5, at 823. 
19. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-35, 38-40; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 823. 
20. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37; Critique, supra note 5, at 823; see also Act 
of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (1978) (authorizing the limited e11 bane 
process); 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (implementing the limited e11 bane process). 
21. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-36, 38; Critique, supra note 5, at 824; Hug, 
supra note 6, at 897-98, 906-08. 
22. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34. Judicial vacancies complicate efforts to 
assemble sufficient argument panels. See id; see also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 95, tbl.7 (1998) (affording relevant data on 
disposition times) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]. 
23. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-36; Critique, supra note 5, at 823-24; see also 
infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
24. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-45. The Commission specifically rejected circuit-
splitting as an acceptable solution for docket growth. Id. at 44; see also infra notes 64-70 and 
accompanying text. 
25. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-50; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 824. 
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The most troubling feature of the divisional arrangement is the 
Commission's determination to abandon circuit-wide stare decisis.26 The 
divisional concept would jettison the existing circuit-wide en bane court 
and encourage inconsistent circuit law by permitting the judges in one 
division to ignore the precedent of the other two divisions.27 Moreover, the 
Circuit Division, the Commission's major remedy for this situation, would 
be unresponsive principally because of its narrowly circumscribed 
authority.28 For instance, under Senate Bill 253, the Circuit Division could 
treat only direct conflicts between divisions and could not entertain cases 
sua sponte.29 The Commission's approach would also eliminate current 
informal procedures that enable any judge to notify panel members of pos-
sible departures from circuit precedent and to maintain consistency absent 
en bane hearings.30 
Implementation of the divisional plan would lead to additional com-
plications. First, applying this idea would impose a new layer of judicial 
review.31 Indeed, the chief judges of seven appellate courts trenchantly ad-
monished that the "whole concept of intracircuit divisions, replete with its 
two levels of en bane review, has far more drawbacks than benefits."32 
Second, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to hear cases from a single 
division that contradict opinions issued by a circuit; even were the Justices 
amenable to review, there would be greater pressure on the Supreme Court 
to resist the balkanization of federal law.33 Third, the Circuit Division's 
thirteen members would rotate slowly and, thus, could "lock out strong 
dissenting voices."34 The present eleven-judge limited en bane court, con-
sisting of the chief judge and ten judges drawn at random, is much more 
representative of the full court than the proposed Circuit Division's thirteen 
members-the chief judge and twelve judges, four from each division for 
26. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 382-83; Hug, supra note 6, at 909. 
27. See Akrotirianakis et al., supra note 13, at 380-81; Hellman, supra note 7, at 384, 390; Hug, 
supra note 6, at 909. 
28. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 384-88; see also Tobias, supra note 12, at 306-07. 
29. See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 45; Hug, supra note 6, 
at 909-10. 
30. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 390; Hug, supra note 6, at 907. For more discussion of Circuit 
Division authority, as well as how ilS decisions' limited impact and the divisions' operation essentially 
as separate courlS would make law of the circuit nearly irrelevant, see Hellman, supra note 7, at 384-
88, 390-91. 
31. See Critique, supra note 5, at 825; House Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Ronald 
Olson). 
32. Harry T. Edwards et al., Memorandum from Chief Judge to the Commission 
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998) 
<http://app.comm.uscour1S.gov/report/comments/Becker.htm> ; accordHug, supra note 6, at 899-906, 
909-15. 
33. See Critique, supra note 5, at 825. The Supreme Court alone would resolve confliclS between 
a division and a circuit. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. 
34. Critique, supra note 5, at 825-26. 
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three-year terms-would be.35 Moreover, the full court would no longer 
participate in the en bane process by calling for en bane reconsideration or 
voting on whether to take a case en bane under the arrangement that the 
Commission recommended.36 The Commission's approach would also 
effectively divide the court "into three circuits" with little justification for 
their boundaries or added costs. 37 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the plan might warrant considera-
tion if the Commission had identified a serious failing that smaller 
decisionmaking entities could rectify. However, no empirical data demon-
strate the existence of any such problems. The Commission's rationale for 
the divisional arrangement was that the "law-declaring function of 
appellate courts requires groups of judges smaller than the present Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals."38 The Commission concomitantly premised this 
conclusion on two intertwined notions: (1) "the inability of judges [on 
large circuits] to monitor all the decisions the entire court of appeals 
renders"39 and (2) "large appellate units have difficulty developing and 
maintaining consistent and coherent law."40 
These propositions cannot withstand scrutiny. The idea that members 
of a court must read, remember, and catalog every opinion to keep up with 
and apply circuit law is "a relic of the pre-computer era."41 The 
Commission confused quite different actions: staying abreast of circuit 
precedent and monitoring of panel decisions.42 The Commission expressed 
concern about the "volume of opinions produced by the Ninth Circuit"43 
but neglected to state that quantity does not correspond with circuit size, a 
phenomenon manifested by three other circuits having issued more 
35. See Hug, supra note 6, at 907. Compare sources cited supra note 20 with COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. Because the Northern Division would have only 22% of the caseload and, 
thus, presumably 22% of the judges, and the Southern Division would have 47% of the caseload and 
47% of the judges, Circuit Division representation would not proportionately represent the full court. 
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at45; see also Hug, supra note 6, at 909, 915. 
36. Compare sources cited supra note 20 and infra note 91 with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
2, at45. 
37. Critique, supra note 5, at 826-27; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix-x, 36; 
Hellman, supra note 7, at 392-93 (claiming that the plan would divide the Court of Appeals). The idea 
in the text is especially troubling, as the Commission lauds a unified circuit's interpretation of federal 
law in the West and preservation of large-scale administrative efficiency. See Critique, supra note 5, at 
826-27; infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
38. COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 2, at 47. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Procter Hug, Jr., Letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals to Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court (Aug. 29, 1998) 
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/hug.htm>. 
42. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 394-95. 
43. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47. 
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published decisions than the Ninth Circuit in 1998.44 Professor Arthur 
Hellman finds "the evidence leaves no doubt that the judges of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals engage in a substantial amount of opinion 
monitoring."45 His empirical research shows, and the experience of former 
Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace confirms,46 the weakness in the 
Commission assertion that large appellate entities cannot maintain consis-
tent and coherent law. In short, no convincing empirical data support the 
drastic modification that the Commission advocated.47 
Without fairly evaluating how well the Ninth Circuit operates today, 
the Commission implied that size alone presents a conundrum that justifies 
radical change. The Commission actually conceded that large size affords 
benefits. For example, the Commission hailed a unified court's ability to 
construe federal law and realize operational efficiencies.48 Pamela 
Rymer-a Ninth Circuit judge and a commissioner who strongly advocates 
the Commission plan-similarly testified: "no one seriously questions 
how the circuit performs its administrative functions. The circuit's size 
allows for flexibility in assignment [and] economies of scale.''49 
In short, the Commission's recommendation for a divisional restruc-
turing would neither address the concerns that prompted the study nor re-
alize the Commission's own specifically-~culated objectives.50 Splitting 
the Ninth Circuit would also fail to treat the concerns or attain the goals, as 
the next section demonstrates. 
44. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 1998 54, tbl.S-3 (1999). 
45. Hellman, supra note 7, at 395; see also id. at 395-96 (adducing evidence from procedure 
whereby off-panel judges can use the en bane process to raise questions about opinions); supra note 30 
and accompanying text (discussing that procedure). 
46. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 397-401; infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (citing his 
work); J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 299 (1994). 
47. The absence of examples and few specifics are symptomatic of limited evidentiary support, 
while the Commission's allusions to ''perceptions" of greater inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit and to 
its own "judgment, based on experience" are weak foundations for such radical change. COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; see also Hellman, supra note 7, at 397-401; Tobias, supra note 12, at 311-
12. 
48. See COM!lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix-x, 36; Critique, supra note 5, at 827 n.46. 
49. Senate Hearing, supra note 17; accord Hellman, supra note 7, at 401-02; Critique, supra 
note 5, at 827 n.51. 
50. These goals include relieving the Supreme Court without balkanizing federal law, increasing 
the legitimacy of the limited en bane process, and retaining a large circuit's major benefits. See 
COM!lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 36, 48-50; Critique, supra note 5, at 822-25. For more discussion 
of these, and other, criticisms, see Hug, supra note 6, at 909-15; Critique, supra, at 824-27; Hellman, 
supra note 7, at 381-401. 
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II 
THE PROPOSALS To SPLIT THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
A. Rationales for Circuit-Splitting 
Some of the criticisms of the divisional structure may have led to the 
March 2000 proposal of legislation that would split the Ninth Circuit. 51 
Senate Bill 2184 was only the latest of numerous attempts to reconfigure 
the circuit. Since 1983, there have been five major efforts; the most recent 
had commenced in 1995 and culminated in the compromise that authorized 
the Commission.52 
Circuit-splitting proponents have presented numerous overlapping 
rationales for bifurcation, many of which the Commission reproduced and 
we discussed above.53 Advocates of circuit-splitting also argue that 
California perspectives, judges, and appeals dominate the court.54 The 
Commission alluded to this contention,55 even as it declared that "[t]here is 
one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to realign circuits 
. . . and to restructure courts . . . because of particular decisions or 
particular judges."56 Over time, champions of bifurcation have variously 
phrased these propositions and accorded them different emphases. Current 
proponents downplay the role of California and politics,57 while they em-
phasize the concerns regarding court administration and other Commission 
rationales. 
B. Analysis of Senate Bill 2184 
Senate Bill 2184, introduced in March 2000 by Senators Hatch and 
Murkowski, 58 would establish a new Twelfth Circuit consisting of Alaska, 
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, 
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
52. See Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide tlze 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917, 
928-34 (1990); Hellman, supra note 7, at 379-80; Tobias, supra note 6, at 198-214. 
53. These reasons include size, inadequate collegiality and interpersonal communication, slow 
case resolution and insufficiently consistent and coherent circuit law that allegedly results from the 
inability of judges to "keep up with the large volume" of opinions and of the court to perform its e11 
bane functions effectively. CoM!lfiSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37; see also supra notes 19-20 
and accompanying text. 
54. See Baker, supra note 52, at 940-43; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circ11it·Splitting, 
44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1371-73 (1995). A recent incarnation of this argument appears in a Senate debate 
over confirmation. "[T]he 9th Circuit has become lopsided with activist judges that has helped push it 
far out of the judicial mainstream .... Confirming Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon to the 9th Circuit 
would only exacerbate its problems." 146 CoNG. REc. S1298 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2000) (statement of 
Sen. Bunning). 
55. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 36. 
56. Id. at 6. ''This rule must be faithfully honored, for the independence of the judiciary is of 
constitutional dimension and requires no less." Id. 
57. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
58. See 146 CONG. REc. S1233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000). 
2000] NINTH CIRCUIT 1665 
and Washington, leaving Arizona, California, and Nevada in the Ninth 
Circuit.59 The sponsors supported the proposal with previously-enunciated 
reasons, such as intra-circuit inconsistency, a high reversal rate, inability of 
the courts' members to monitor all opinions, and deficiencies in the limited 
en bane process. 60 Senator Hatch explained the last two ideas: 
Absent the ability of each active judge on the Ninth Circuit to read 
each ... published decision, there can be no assurance that calls 
will be made for en bane review of those cases which judges 
believe merit rehearing, ... [while the en bane] system is being 
utilized with insufficient frequency ... [and] a limited en bane 
decision ... [may] not reflect the views of a majority of the 
circuit's judges. 61 
Senator Murkowski specifically stated that Senate Bill 2184 was a "more 
direct and simplified solution to the problems of the Ninth Circuit" than the 
divisional arrangement with which a few Senate members "were not too 
happy."62 
Among the many reasons that Congress should not enact Senate Bill 
2184, there are some ideas that resemble the criticisms of the divisional 
approach as well as others that include the Commission's cogent argu-
ments against bifurcation.63 The Commission saw "no good reason to split 
the circuit solely out of concern for its size or administration ... [or] the 
consistency, predictability, and coherence of circuit law," while "splitting 
the circuit would impose substantial costs of administrative disruption 
[and] the monetary costs of creating a new circuit.''64 The Commission 
considered bifurcation an improper long-term solution to the caseload in-
creases that most appellate courts will encounter.65 For example, circuit-
splitting could further burden the Supreme Court and additionally splinter 
federal law, mainly by increasing intercircuit inconsistency.66 The 
Commission also observed that this remedy would "deprive the West and 
59. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). 
60. Each ascribed these to size. See 146 CONG. REc. at Sl233-34 (statement of Sen. Murkowski); 
id. at S 1234-35 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also supra notes 19-20, 53 and accompanying text. 
61. 146 CONG. REc. at S 1235. He stated that two circuits, whose judges ''will have one-half as 
many of their colleagues' opinions to read," would better promote error correction and coherence. Id. 
62. Id. at S1233. 
63. In light of our analysis above, certain arguments deserve relatively limited treatment here. 
However, additional consideration is warranted because the Commission is an authoritative source that 
carefully analyzed the issues. Moreover, it was unable to respond directly to the sponsors' contentions. 
64. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix, 29. The Commission expressly stated that 
bifurcation would sacrifice administrative advantages, including flexible judicial assignments and 
specific economies of scale. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
65. See CoMr.nssION REPORT, supra note 2, at x, 44; see also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 22, at 
93, tbl. l (affording caseload data). 
66. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 
100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1404-09 (1987); Tobias, supra note 54, at 1386-87; Critique, supra note 5, at 
824. 
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the Pacific seaboard of a means for maintaining uniform federal law in that 
area."67 Praising the administrative advantages of retaining a unified cir-
cuit, the Commission confidently concluded that the divisional concept 
would vitiate the need for a split.68 The Commission explored more than a 
dozen possibilities for bifurcation and "found no merit in any:" 69 
[l]t is impossible to create from the current Ninth Circuit two or 
more circuits that would result in both an equitable number of 
appeals per judge and courts of appeals small enough to operate 
with the sort of collegiality we envision, unless the State of 
California were to be split between judicial circuits-an option we 
believe to be undesirable.70 
The Commission and other observers correctly concluded that the 
complex geographic and demographic configuration of the Ninth Circuit 
makes it defy bifurcation.71 The recent bill, like numerous earlier measures, 
would require judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit to address a considera-
bly larger, more complicated docket than judges of the projected Twelfth 
Circuit.72 A split would correspondingly eliminate the appellate court that 
has long employed, and experimented with, creative measures to address 
mounting appeals. 73 The circuit should continue this ambitious testing be-
cause caseload growth and comparatively limited resources suggest that 
most courts will increasingly resemble the Ninth Circuit, which will serve 
as a model.74 
67. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at x. It similarly declared that having one court in the 
West interpret federal law, especially "commercial and maritime laws that govern relations with [other 
Pacific Rim nations is a strength] that should be maintained." Id. at 49-50. 
68. See id. at 52; see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
69. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at53; see also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 52. 
71. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text; see also Baker, supra note 52, at 938, 945-46; 
Tobias, supra note 54, at 1409-15. 
72. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Carl Tobias, Why 
Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REv. 583, 590-91 (1997). These ideas 
contradict Senator Hatch's claim that each new court's judges would read only half as many cases. See 
supra note 61. 
73. See JOE CECIL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE 
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE 
INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman 
ed., 1990). The Commission seemed to recognize this by finding Ninth Circuit administration "on a par 
with that of other circuits, and innovative in many respects," creativity that screening panels' use 
illustrates. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix; see also infra notes 106-107 and accompanying 
text (analyzing screening panels). 
74. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 7, at 402; Wallace, supra note 46. Responses to the sponsors' 
ideas elsewhere obviate the need for more treatment here. For example, insofar as they repeat the 
Commission ideas about large courts and the reversal rate, we have addressed the ideas. Compare 
supra notes 19-20, 38-40, 60 and accompanying text with supra notes 41-47, infra notes 96-98 and 
accompanying text. For a thorough critique of circuit-splitting, see THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 99-105 (1994). 
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In sum, the major difficulty with both the divisional concept and 
circuit-splitting is misplaced reliance on unsupported assumptions that the 
Ninth Circuit experiences severe problems and, therefore, should be re-
structured into divisions or into two separate courts to resolve the 
complications.75 No empirical data demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit has 
serious failings or requires such dramatic alteration.76 Finally, drastic 
change should be rejected when more promising measures are readily 
available. 
m 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH 
In contrast to the proposed draconian solutions of restructuring into 
autonomous divisions or circuit-splitting, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a 
tempered approach for addressing the perceived shortcomings reported to 
or considered by the Commission. In 1999, shortly after the Commission 
issued its final report, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established an 
Evaluation Committee. The Committee has assessed and continues to ana-
lyze circuit processes and procedures and has already suggested a score of 
ways to enhance operations in areas highlighted by the Commission.77 
A. Consistent and Certain Circuit Law 
Both the Commission and the sponsors of Senate Bill 2184 errone-
ously assert that Ninth Circuit law lacks uniformity and coherence. 78 The 
"only systematic study" of the operation of precedent in a large court, 
which assessed efforts "to maintain a consistent body of law ,"79 found that 
"the pattern of [multiple relevant precedents] exemplified by high visibility 
issues . . . is not characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally. 
Nor is intracircuit conflict."80 The Commission acknowledged, yet 
75. Neither the great majority of judges and lawyers in the Ninth Circuit nor those appearing at 
the hearings in the Ninth Circuit or submitting statements think so. See Hug, supra note 6, at 897. 
76. Change so drastic as the Commission and the sponsors urge in a century-old institution 
should occur only if empirical data clearly show that the court experiences serious difficulties. See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 44-45 (1995). 
77. See NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT (2000) [hereinafter 
EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT]. In July 1999, the Committee solicited the bar's input on 
the en bane process, consistency and certainty, regional concerns and calendaring, delay and 
productivity, written and oral advocacy, mediation and technology. See id. at 1-2. 
78. See supra notes 19, 60-61 and accompanying text. 
79. JUDITH MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 94 (1993). The Federal Judicial Center is the courts' research arm. See 
28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994). 
80. Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in 
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 86. The study covered two distinct years of Ninth Circuit 
opinions, which the court decided over a much longer period. See MCKENNA, supra note 79, at 94; 
Hellman, supra note 7, at 398. 
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essentially ignored, that study81 and did not even mention a subsequent 
Federal Judicial Center evaluation that mirrors the initial study's findings.82 
Admitting that the Commission lacked time to conduct a "statistically 
meaningful analysis" of all Ninth Circuit dispositions to make an objective 
determination,83 the Commission undertook a survey of the court's district 
judges and lawyers that provided only inconclusive results84 and ultimately 
conceded that "consistency and predictability [defy] statistical analysis."85 
In short, neither the Commission nor the circuit-splitting advocates 
presented empirical data to document that the court's law is less uniform 
than that of the remaining circuits. All of the empirical data actually sug-
gest otherwise. Nevertheless, because the Evaluation Committee thought 
that circuit size could lead to a perception of inconsistency, it focused on 
strengthening the capacity of the court for early detection and immediate 
treatment of possible or apparent conflicts.86 The Committee asked that 
judges and counsel notify the court of inconsistencies among unpublished 
memorandum dispositions and between those decisions and published 
opinions, creating an "electronic mailbox" to facilitate this exchange.87 
Moreover, it urged, and the Advisory Rules Committee has implemented, a 
two-year experiment whereby lawyers may cite unpublished memorandum 
dispositions in petitions for rehearing or requests for publication in order to 
identify perceived conflicts.88 The circuit is also currently testing the 
Committee's proposed system in which staff attorneys employ their 
81. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39 n.93. "It is the Commission's prerogative to 
reject the methods or conclusions of empirical research, but it is regrettable that the Commission 
simply gives up and declares that the concepts are too subtle to warrant analysis." Hellman, supra note 
7, at 398. 
82. "[D]espite concerns about the proliferation of precedent as the courts of appeals grow, there 
is currently little evidence that intracircuit inconsistency is a significant problem ... [or] that whatever 
intracircuit conflict exists is strongly correlated with circuit size." MCKENNA, supra note 79, at 94; 
accord Hellman, supra note 7, at 398. 
83. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39. 
84. For example, district judges "find(] the law insufficiently clear to give them confidence in 
their decisions on questions of law about as often as their counterparts in other circuits,'' while 
attorneys report "somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting outcomes of appeals 
than lawyers elsewhere." Id. at 39-40; see also Hellman, supra note 7, at 399 (urging "caution in 
interpreting the survey results"). 
85. CoMr.nsslON REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. "These concepts are too subtle, the decline in 
quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to isolate, to allow evaluation in a frceze-
framed moment." Id. But see supra note 81. 
86. See Ev ALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 8-10. 
87. See Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The Innovative 
Work of the Evaluation Committee 2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); 
Memorandum from Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Members of the 
Academic Community (Jan. 2000) (on file with author) (providing the conflicts form). 
88. See EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 6-7. Lawyers can also 
alert the circuit to conflicts. See Hug, supra note 87, at 2; see also 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (Circuit Rule 36-3 
has been adopted for a limited 30-month period, beginning July 1, 2000 and ending December 31, 
2002. Thereafter the Advisory Committee on Rules will issue a recommendation on whether the rule 
should be made permanent). 
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subject-matter expertise and objective criteria to monitor rehearing en bane 
petitions to identify potential inconsistencies and sensitive decisions for 
careful judicial scrutiny.89 
B. The Limited En Banc Process 
The senators who introduced Senate Bill 2184 seemingly accepted 
without question the Commission's claims that the en bane process is not 
representative and prompts the Supreme Court to reverse many cases.90 
Both notions are unpersuasive. The circuit believes the limited en bane 
process uses scarce institutional resources effectively and respects all 
judges' interest in law-declaration.91 However, to address the perception of 
unrepresentativeness, the Evaluation Committee commissioned an expert, 
independent study that reaffirmed the legitimacy of the process by finding 
that eleven members do "fairly represent the court as a whole."92 Despite 
this conclusion, the Committee asked the circuit to examine enlarging the 
en bane court and reducing the number of votes needed to take a case en 
bane, potentially expanding the quantity of annual appeals heard en bane.93 
The court endorsed these concepts as a "reasoned, responsible alternative 
to the radical restructuring proposed by Senate Bill 253" because it is "as 
concerned with perceptions as with reality ."94 In recognition that the 
changes will increase en bane reconsideration, the circuit has also begun to 
experiment with quarterly sessions of the en bane court.95 
The proposition that the limited en bane device contributes to a high 
reversal rate in the Supreme Court is even less convincing. The reversal 
rate has minimal relevance to court administration and structure. Circuit 
Judge Rymer, a Commission member, "representing and speaking on its 
behalf," testified that the reversal rate "is not a problem that the 
Commission identified or ... believes should weigh into the consideration 
89. The criteria include invalidation of a statute or issuance of a dissent. See Hug, supra note 87, 
at 2. The Committee is evaluating internal review of all cases for consistency before their release. See 
id. 
90. Compare supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text with supra note 20 and accompanying 
text. 
91. See Hug, supra note 87, at 3. Each active and senior judge can request en bane rehearing, 
while the entire process promotes productive exchange regarding legal issues. See id. 
92. Id. at 3-4. An en bane court of eleven judges is approximately 94% representative 
statistically. Since Congress authorized the limited en bane court in 1978, the court bas issued over 170 
decisions. A third of the opinions were unanimous, and 75% had a majority of eight to three or greater, 
which strongly suggests that a full-court en bane would have reached identical decisions. Id. at 3. 
93. See EVALUATION COM!lllTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 2-6. Senate Bill 1403, 
106th Cong. (1999), which Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced, embodies these ideas and regional 
assignments, discussed infra notes 94, 102 and accompanying text; see also supra note 17. 
94. Hug, supra note 87, at 4. The circuit also endorsed regional assignments. See id. at 2; see also 
infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
95. See EVALUATION COM!IHTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 5-6. 
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of structural alternatives."96 Moreover, the ten-year reversal rate statistics 
reveal that the number of Ninth Circuit decisions overturned has never ex-
ceeded one half of one percent of the total circuit terminations on the mer-
its.97 The Ninth Circuit's reversal rate was also lower than the median 
reversal rate for three years and within eight percentage points of the 
median for two, and it was highest of all the circuits in only one year out of 
the ten.98 
C. Collegiality and Communications 
The sponsors of Senate Bill 2184 appeared to adopt uncritically the 
Commission's claims that the circuit lacks collegiality and interpersonal 
communication.99 However, these notions defy empirical verification, as 
the Commission frankly admitted in stating that collegiality "cannot be 
quantified or measured," even as it recognized that continuing reliance on 
technology will improve communication and case resolution. 100 The 
Evaluation Committee found no problems with collegiality in the Ninth 
Circuit; however, the Committee has proffered several ideas on regional-
ism and calendaring to address perceived concerns about communications, 
collegiality, circuit linkages with the areas served, and the need for re-
gional viewpoints in appellate decisionmaking. 101 It proposed, and the cir-
cuit is testing, regional assignments that require one judge from the 
administrative unit out of which the appeal arises to serve on the panel 
hearing the case. 102 Moreover, the Committee recommended, and the court 
has employed, oral argument sittings in more cities and combined them 
with bench-bar activities to improve communications throughout the 
circuit.103 
96. Senate Hearing, supra note 17. For similar ideas, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 
6. 
97. See NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS LAW LIBRARY TABLE ON U.S. SUPREME COURT 
REVERSAL RATES (1998). 
98. See id.; see also Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the Coulltry-
Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465 (1997); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998). Another concern is 
circuit inability to keep up with the volume of cases.See supra notes 19, 39, 43 and accompanying text. 
But see supra notes 41-42, 44-47 and accompanying text. 
99. Compare Hatch and Murkowski Statements, supra note 60 with supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
100. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 824. For 
analyses of collegiality, see FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215 
(1994); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335, 
1358-62 (1998); Deanell Reece Taeha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585 (1995). 
101. See EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPoRT, s11pra note 77, at 12-13. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 13. In 1999 alone, the court held oral arguments and bench-bar meetings in 
Anchorage, Coeur d' Alene (Idal!o), Missoula (Mont.), San Diego, Phoenix, and Honolulu. See id. 
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D. Productivity and Expediting Review 
In response to perceived concerns about case delays, the Evaluation 
Committee has instituted several actions to enhance productivity and expe-
dite review. 104 It has suggested, and the court is experimenting with, in-
creased "batching" of cases that involve similar issues or statutes before 
the same argument panel for faster disposition.105 The Committee has urged 
continuing use of the innovative oral motions and screening calendars106 in 
which a panel considers relatively uncomplicated appeals-ones that clear 
precedent readily resolves-in deciding 340 motions and 140 cases each 
month. 107 
For the reasons stated, we believe that the faulty assumptions and 
premises, as well as the lack of empirical data, that underlie the 
Commission's work and the recent sponsorship of Senate Bill 2184 raise 
serious questions about the wisdom of implementing the changes that the 
Commission and circuit-splitting advocates champion. Nevertheless, the 
Evaluation Committee has begun to treat perceived concerns, and the court 
has already implemented many of the Committee's recommendations. 
Fortunately, the circuit can apply most of the proposals without 
congressional authorization. These measured, well-considered steps to ad-
dress perceived concerns, if coupled with prompt Senate confirmation of 
nominees for the current circuit vacancies, 108 should enable the court to 
function at the peak of its abilities and eliminate any concerns about circuit 
operations. The Committee's approach will relieve the Supreme Court, yet 
not splinter federal law, by limiting intracircuit and intercircuit inconsis-
tency; will enhance the validity of the en bane process, primarily through 
increased frequency of application; and will retain a large circuit's benefits 
because it would leave the circuit intact. In sum, the Evaluation Committee 
approach should attain the goals of the Commission and the sponsors of 
Senate Bill 2184 with greater efficacy and less disruption than their pro-
posals. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals and the introduction of Senate Bill 2184 have advanced the 
104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
105. See EVALUATION CoM?.fiTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 71. 
106. See Hug, supra note 87. 
107. See id.; Co1111111ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. The above measures and other actions 
show that the circuit is treating concerns apart from ones voiced by the Commission and the sponsors, 
and is responsive to all of its consumers. The process is ongoing, and. the court is committed to 
continuing self-analysis and to more testing and innovation which will foster even greater future 
efficacy. See Hug, supra note 87. 
108. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal 
Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 19 REv. LITIG. 233 (2000); sources cited supra note 54. 
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dialogue about the Ninth Circuit. However, the court's continued applica-
tion of, and experimentation with, a broad spectrum of promising measures 
will better address the concerns identified than either the divisional concept 
or circuit-splitting. Congress is now considering the two more drastic 
approaches, but it should reject them as ineffective and unduly disruptive. 
